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Abstract 
 
Achieving economies of scale for UAV operations inevitably requires the operation of many 
UAVs by few human operators, whether it is for time-critical tasks such as search and rescue 
or postal delivery involving fleets of UAVs. Although it is technically possible to operate 
many UAVs with one operator, operation of multiple UAVs conducting beneficial tasks in a 
civilian airspace environment requires consideration of the associated risks.   
 
This paper is concerned with the question of how can the reliability of multi-UAV operations 
with human operators be analysed for assessing safety? This paper takes the view that a UAV 
team with human operators can be considered like any other system and analysed using 
functional safety principles. For this purpose, this paper presents a multi-UAV mission 
modelling and simulation framework with a human workload model.  
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Introduction 
 
There are many tasks which UAVS could accomplish more efficiently in greater numbers. For 
example, teams of UAVs for remote sensing tasks or postal delivery in urban areas. A 
commercial operator may wish to fly multiple low size, weight and power machines at the 
same time, to improve economies of scale. Unfortunately, in Australia standard RPA 
operating conditions prohibit autonomous flight and operating more than one UAV at the 
same time [1].  
 
The performance and limitations of humans in supervisory control of UAVs is well 
understood for high levels of autonomy [2,3]. For low levels of autonomy, the human operator 
remains an integral part of the system safety, being responsible for monitoring the safe 
operation of the UAVs, and overseeing and managing potentially hazardous situations. 
Further work is required to quantitatively assess the reliability of low-cost multi-UAV 
operations.  
 
For this reason, this paper presents a multi-UAV mission modelling and simulation 
framework with a human workload model. This paper considers a functional safety-like 
framework and quantifying performance by modelling and simulating physical system 
constraints on the human operators. 
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Multi-UAS with Human Operator(s) Safety Assessment Methodology 
 
IEC 61508 is a risk-based safety standard that concerns the management of safety through the 
entire life-cycle of a system. It is primarily for electrical/electronic hardware and software 
systems however its principles are general [4,5]. The standard is concerned with 
accomplishing system safety actively, through the development of safety functions which are 
meant to achieve or maintain a safe system state, in the event of hazardous situations 
occurring. The standard considers that hazards carrying risks, are posed to the outside world 
by malfunctions of the UAV control system, human error, or other reasonably foreseeable 
events [4,5]. Unfortunately, despite humans being an integral part of system safety, and 
accidents being partly caused by humans, IEC 61508 does not explicitly address how to 
consider human factors. However, frameworks that address human factors have been 
proposed [6,7].  
 
Fig. 1 shows a functional safety-like model for a team of N UAVs with autopilots. Each UAV 
with its control system provides utility to the outside world (for example, collecting image 
data in remote sensing), but also risks (for example, hitting other aircraft). Within each 
autopilot are safety functions tightly coupled with the UAV flight control system (FCS). The 
failsafes detect anomalous conditions and execute safety functions to manage the risk. Typical 
autopilot software failsafes are to return to launch, loiter, land, or hand over control to the 
human operators [8].  
 
In many cases, such as for flight over populated areas or with other airspace users, the risk 
will not be sufficiently managed with onboard safety functions alone. It is preferable to have 
safety functions which are external to the FCS which is known as a protection system. Fig. 1 
shows a team of M UAV operators that can be considered as a protection system 
implementing safety functions. The protection system observes the hazards and controls the 
UAVs (e.g. through manual RC control) and autopilot (e.g. via setting waypoints on a GCS) 
to ensure the risks are managed.  
 
M<N Protection System Design 
 
M humans operating a team of N UAVs where    , can be considered as an “    
protection system”. To scale up operations or reduce human resourcing, it is sought to invert 
this to an     protection system while achieving the same protection as    . The 
design of such a protection system for a particular mission includes determining the value of 
M, determining which humans are to be assigned to which UAVs, what tasks the humans 
should perform in the event of hazardous situations, and other considerations, to maintain an 
acceptable risk level.  
 
A question is how to assess the performance of     compared to    ? Empirical 
studies of human performance are difficult and probabilistic arguments often require complex 
justification. Instead, it is proposed that performance can be quantified by the number of tasks 
that cannot be achieved from the total number of tasks required, F, because of the physical 
system constraints such as time, UAV position and velocity, UAV battery available etc.  For 
an     case, given that the number of possible parallel tasks (one task per UAV at any 
time), is less than or equal to the number of humans, it is implied that F=0 since resourcing is 
sufficient (human workload is managed). Then the performance of an     protection 
system can be considered equivalent if F=0.  That is, if fewer humans can achieve the same 
required tasks as more humans, then the performance can be considered equivalent. The next 
sections present modelling and simulation which is used to determine under what 
circumstances or tasks F=0 regions can be obtained for   . 
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Multi-UAV Mission Model 
The mission model considers a team of N UAVs operating in an environment described by a 
3D cube {x,y,z} with specified minimum and maximum boundaries. A mission is defined as 
UAVs autonomously following waypoints over a time duration           . For this paper’s 
purpose, a flat Earth and no obstacle constraints is assumed. 
 
Figure 1 Human operators performing the role of a protection system implementing safety 
functions for protecting against risks 
 
A hazardous situation is defined as a situation which causes the acceptable risk threshold to be 
exceeded while the UAVs are in any location in the environment. The team of human 
operators collectively manage the risk through manual UAV control at task request time   . 
The safety functions to be performed include observing the hazards (situational awareness), 
deciding which actions to take and when (task scheduling), which humans should perform 
which tasks (task assignment), and finally executing the tasks (taking control actions). 
 
A typical control action is to move a UAV to a chosen goal location such as to maintain 
separation from other aircraft, or for safe forced landing or flight termination. The interaction 
time IT associated with this action can be defined, as the time duration over which the human 
interacts with a UAV [1,8]: 
 
       {(         )
 
 (         )
 
 (         )
 
}
   
         (1) 
 
where   ,    ,    is the UAV position when the action is taken at time       after some wait 
time duration     where            , and   ,    ,    is the goal position.       is 
the velocity (assumed constant) at which the human will move the UAV. It is assumed that the 
human will move the UAV in a straight line (shortest) path towards the goal. 
 
Wait time (WT) is the time duration that the UAV can wait before being attended to [1,8]. If 
the action is not taken by the time the wait time elapses, it is assumed that the risk is not 
managed. Maximum WT can be modelled by the amount of battery time available when the 
human takes action (BT) accounting for the IT required:  
 
                    .         (2) 
 
                      ,        (3) 
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where        is reserve battery time. If the UAV is loitering, then IT and WT can be 
determined from the approximate location where the hazardous situation occurred        
      . Note that the purpose of UAV autonomy (loitering) in this setting is to increase WT to 
alleviate human workload [2,3]. 
 
Task Assignment Model 
The AssignTasks algorithm (Figure 2) models the assignment of human resources to tasks, 
accounting for the interaction times required and wait times, and considering the UAV 
position and specified goal location. This algorithm determines the integer number of tasks 
that were failed to be assigned (Nfailed) given up to N UAV task requests at time t_r. t_r is 
the tasks' request time; N is number of UAVs; M is number of operators; T is a [1xN] binary 
(1 indicates a task request and 0 indicates no task) row vector of task requests at time t_r, 
where column-indices are taken as an integer UAV ID from 1 to N; Nt = sum(N) is the 
number of task requests; UAVID is a [1xNt] binary row vector of UAV ID's that have task 
requests; RT is a [1xNt] vector of request times, RT(1)=RT(2)...=RT(Nt)=t_r. 
 
function ASSIGNTASKS(T,x,y,z,x_g,y_g,z_g,t_r,N,M) 
1. Calculate interaction and wait time periods for each task at request time t = t_r 
(equations (1-3)) and put in variables IT: a [1xNt] vector of interaction time periods, and 
WT: a [1xNt] vector of wait time periods. 
  
WF is a [1xNt] vector of wait finished times,(or start deadlines), where WF = RT+WT; 
FDL is a [1xNt] vector of task finish deadlines. The tasks must be completed by times FDL, 
where FDL = RT+WT+IT 
  
2. In the case of >1 request at request time t_r, determine the order in which the tasks are 
attended to. Here, we assume the human will attend to tasks by earliest finish deadline 
(numerous alternatives could be considered). 
Sort RT,IT,WT by ascending ordered FDL 
[FDL, I] = sort_ascending(FDL) 
where I is the index set of sorted elements 
RT = RT(I) 
IT = IT(I) 
WT = WT(I) 
UAVID = UAVID(I) 
  
3. Proceed to assign tasks to resources.  
Here, UAVIDstruct is an [1xNt] array structure with two elements (1) succeeded (1 if task 
succeeded, or assigned, 0 if task not succeeded, or unassigned), and (2) resource which is an 
integer ID for the human, from 1 to for keeping track of which resource did the task. 
  
Assign the first task to the first human. 
1 StartTime(1) = RT(1) {the start time of the first task. The first task is started without 
waiting} 
2 EndTime(1) = StartTime(1) + IT(1) {the end time of the first task} 
3 previous_succeed_endtime(1) = EndTime(1) {for each resource, keep track of the previous     
assigned task end time, which is when the human resource is available to start a new task} 
4 UAVIDstruct(1).succeeded = 1 
5 UAVIDstruct(1).resource = 1 {give first task to the first human} 
6 succeedcount = 1 {counter for the number of succeeded tasks} 
  
7 for i = 2:Nt {Task requests loop} 
8    for nr = 1:M  {Human resources loop} 
Only proceed if the i'th task has not been assigned to a resource. This prevents more than one 
resource being assigned to the same task 
9        if UAVIDstruct(i).succeeded == 0 then 
10           if RT(i) > previous_succeed_endtime(nr) then 
11               StartTime(i) = RT(i)  
12               EndTime(i) = StartTime(i) + IT(i)  
13                succeedcount = succeedcount+1  
14                previous_succeed_endtime(nr) = EndTime(i)  
15                UAVIDstruct(i).succeeded = 1 {Record task as successfully assigned} 
16                UAVIDstruct(i).resource = nr {Record which resource did this task} 
17            else if RT(i) <= previous_succeed_endtime(nr) {start the i'th task when ready} 
18                if WF(i) - previous_succeed_endtime(nr) >= 0 then 
19                    StartTime(i) = previous_succeed_endtime(nr) 
              Repeat lines 12-16 here (omitted for brevity) 
20                else   
21                    StartTime(i) = 0 
22                    EndTime(i) = 0 
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23                    UAVIDstruct(i).succeeded = 0 
24                    UAVIDstruct(i).resource = 0  
25 Return Nfailed = Nt-succeedcount   
 Figure 2 Task Assignment model which models the assignment of tasks to human operators  
 
Results 
 
To illustrate the proposed approach, a 15 minute mission in a 1.5x1.5x0.12 km area with a 
team of 5 UAVs and one operator was simulated. Flight paths for the mission are shown on 
Fig. 4 (black lines). A worst-case scenario was considered where at any time t, the human’s 
must relocate all UAVs to a goal position via manual RC control at      = 5 m/s. The 
simulation determines the number of failed (unachieved) relocation tasks for each possible 
goal position, over all t. As such, the simulation can determine whether F=0 is feasible for the 
IT and WT considered.   
 
Fig. 3 left, shows the task assignment model result for one instance in time and one goal 
location. The result shows how the task intervals can be scheduled such that the human 
operator can achieve all of the tasks because the wait time is sufficient. Fig. 3 right shows the 
IT and WT plotted as a function of mission time t for one potential goal. It can be seen that IT 
increases since the UAVs move away from the goal location over time, and the WT decreases 
with time as the battery depletes.  
 
Fig. 4 left, shows the number of unassigned tasks F as a function of goal location, for 5 UAVs 
travelling North. In this instance, a battery reserve time of 10 minutes was required to increase 
WT in order to achieve an F=0 region. Fig. 4 right, shows the result for different UAV flight 
paths. In this instance, a battery reserve time of 15 minutes was required to achieve an F=0 
region. The results show that under our modelling assumptions, goal regions can be found 
through increasing WT, that if achieved in practice, could enable safe    operations.  
 
Figure 3 Left - Modelled task assignment and task schedule for M = 1, N = 5, showing how 
one human can achieve 5 parallel tasks if WT is sufficient. Right – the interaction times (IT) 
and wait times (WT) for the 5 UAVs, as a function of mission time t.     
 
Conclusion 
 
An approach for analysing the reliability of UAVs has been presented using a functional 
safety framework and modelling and simulation of UAV operations. Through such modelling, 
goal regions for which few human operators can achieve UAV relocation in the event of 
hazardous situations can be identified.  
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Figure 4 Number of unassigned tasks F as a function of goal location, for 1 human operator 
and 5 UAVs: travelling North with random path variations (left figure); 3 UAVs travelling 
North and two UAVs travelling East (right figure).  
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